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RECALIBRATING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY:
HOW TANZIN V. TANVIR, TAYLOR V.
RIOJAS, AND MCCOY V. ALAMU SIGNAL
THE SUPREME COURT’S DISCOMFORT
WITH THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
PATRICK JAICOMO & ANYA BIDWELL*
In December 2020, the United States Supreme Court issued its most
important decision on qualified immunity since Harlow v. Fitzgerald, and the
issue in the case did not even involve the doctrine. In the Court’s unanimous
opinion in Tanzin v. Tanvir, which dealt with the interpretation of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Justice Thomas explicitly distanced the
Court from the very type of policy reasoning used to create qualified
immunity.1 He also embraced the availability of damages claims against
government officials as historically justified and often necessary to vindicate
individual rights and to check the government’s power.2
The Court’s decision in Tanvir—alongside those in Taylor v. Riojas and
McCoy v. Alamu—offers the strongest signal in decades that the Court is
ready to recalibrate its qualified immunity jurisprudence. While it is not time
to celebrate the demise of qualified immunity just yet, this Article will discuss
how the Court’s disposition of those cases reveals the Court is reconsidering
both the foundations and applications of qualified immunity.

* Attorneys at the Institute for Justice and leaders of its Project on Immunity and
Accountability. Much of the discussion in this Article expands on arguments made by the
authors in a series of amicus briefs. See generally Brief for the Institute for Justice as Amicus
Supporting Respondents, Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) (No. 19-71); Brief for the
Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jessop v. City of Fresno, 140 S.
Ct. 2793 (2020) (No. 19-1021); Brief for the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Hernandez v. Mesa, 149 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678).
1
See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 493 (2020).
2
Id. at 491, 493; see infra Section III.B.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring 2020, several high-profile police killings captured the
nation’s attention. In March, Louisville police executing a late-night, noknock raid shot Breonna Taylor to death in her apartment.3 Two months later,
Minneapolis police killed George Floyd, kneeling on his neck in the street
for nearly nine-and-a-half minutes.4 Those incidents and others like them
inspired widespread outrage and provoked calls for police reform. 5 In the
subsequent public discussion, a complex legal doctrine called qualified
immunity was recognized as a chief mechanism by which police avoid
accountability for constitutional violations.
In 1982, the Supreme Court created the qualified immunity doctrine
through its decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.6 Qualified immunity shields all
government officials—including police—from damages when they violate
the Constitution. Under the doctrine, a government official is immune by
default. To overcome immunity, a victim of government abuse must prove
that the government official who caused the harm harmed violated “clearly
established” law,7 which has come to mean that a plaintiff must point to a
prior Supreme Court or circuit court opinion that held nearly identical
3
See, e.g., Radley Balko, Opinion, The No-Knock Warrant for Breonna Taylor was
Illegal, WASH. POST (June 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/03/
no-knock-warrant-breonna-taylor-was-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/779S-MYNR].
4
See, e.g., Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Prosecutors Say Derek Chauvin Knelt on George
Floyd for 9 Minutes 29 Seconds, Longer than Initially Reported, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2021,
10:24 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd-kneel-9minutes-29-seconds.html [https://perma.cc/6W9J-4ZXD].
5
See, e.g., Patrick Jaicomo & Anya Bidwell, Police Act Like Laws Don’t Apply to Them
Because of ‘Qualified Immunity.’ They’re Right., USA TODAY (May 30, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/05/30/police-george-floyd-qualifiedimmunity-supreme-court-column/5283349002/ [https://perma.cc/AAG6-77WV].
6
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982). As discussed in Part II, infra, the
Supreme Court also used the phrase “qualified immunity” between 1967 and 1982 to refer to
a defense of good faith and reasonableness. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
But, as explained later in the Article, that defense bears no resemblance to the modern doctrine
of qualified immunity.
7
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816–18.
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behavior unconstitutional.8 An officer’s subjective intent does not matter.
Even if an officer behaves in bad faith, qualified immunity can still provide
a shield.
Policy, not law, drove the Supreme Court’s adoption of qualified
immunity.9 Concerned that liability and litigation could chill the behavior of
government officials, Harlow largely exempted them from both.10 The
doctrine metastasized from there, eating away at government accountability
almost completely.11 Today, even victims of the most outrageous
unconstitutional conduct are often left without a remedy.12
Harlow’s approach to official liability would have been unrecognizable
to the founders. For the first two centuries of this nation’s history, the
Supreme Court, relying largely on the English common-law precedent, met
the unlawful acts of government officials with strict liability.13 This liability
ensured effective constitutional limits on governmental authority and the
separation of powers.14 The Court addressed law—adjudicating claims and
applying remedies to victims of rights violations—while Congress addressed
policy—adjusting incentives by crafting immunities and indemnifying
government officials who made justifiable mistakes.15 In 1824, Justice Story
articulated those distinct roles in The Apollon, writing that policy is for
Congress; “this Court can only look to the questions, whether the laws have
been violated; and if they were, justice demands, that the injured party should
receive a suitable redress.”16
Harlow swapped the judicial and legislative roles, which resulted in a
decades-long period of hostility toward valid constitutional claims brought
against individual government defendants.17 But there are recent signs that
the Court may be recalibrating on qualified immunity. Three decisions stand
out from the 2020 term. In its November decision, Taylor v. Riojas, the
Supreme Court took the rare step of reversing a grant of qualified immunity.18

8

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015).
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Section II.B.1.
11
See infra Section II.B.
12
See infra Section II.B.3.
13
See infra Part I.
14
Id.
15
See infra Section I.B–C.
16
The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 367 (1824).
17
See infra Section II.B.1.
18
See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020) (per curiam). In the 38 years before
Taylor, the Court had only twice reversed grants of qualified immunity on the ground that the
law was clearly established. See infra Section II.B.3; Appendix.
9
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Three months later, it did so again in McCoy v. Alamu.19 Between those cases,
the Court offered the most promising sign that it may be rethinking qualified
immunity in December 2020, through its unanimous decision in Tanzin v.
Tanvir.20
Authored by Justice Thomas, Tanzin addressed whether damages
against government officials are “appropriate relief” under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.21 The decision did not reach the issue of qualified
immunity,22 but its historical analysis of government official liability directly
undermines the reasoning cited in Harlow to create qualified immunity. And
Tanzin explicitly rejected, despite the government’s best efforts to convince
it to the contrary,23 the Court’s ability to carve out policy-based exceptions
into government liability. Mirroring the words of Justice Story nearly two
centuries earlier in The Apollon, Justice Thomas wrote in Tanzin, “To the
extent the Government asks us to create a . . . policy-based presumption
against damages against individual officials, we are not at liberty to do so.”24
Tanzin, Taylor, and McCoy provide hope that the Court may be
recalibrating qualified immunity to better reflect the historic availability of
damages for constitutional violations. The availability of damages against
government officials animated the American founding and prevailed through
the time Congress passed America’s most significant civil rights legislation:
42 U.S.C. § 1983.25
Part I describes the legal history of official immunity and its
unyieldingly confined nature through the eighteenth, nineteenth, and first
half of the twentieth centuries. Part II addresses the Supreme Court’s twostep creation of qualified immunity and abandonment of historical
government liability beginning in 1967. And Part III discusses how Tanzin,
Taylor, and McCoy show the current Court’s discomfort with qualified
immunity in both theory and practice. Although the Court turned down the
opportunity to revisit qualified immunity in its 2019 term,26 it did so twice in
its 2020 term and, through Tanzin, signaled strongly that the foundations of
qualified immunity are in doubt.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

See McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364, 1364 (2021) (mem.).
See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020).
Id. at 489; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.
Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 492 n.*.
Id. at 493.
Id.
See infra Part I.
See infra note 169.
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I. SUITS FOR DAMAGES AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN
THE CORNERSTONE OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY SINCE
AMERICA’S FOUNDING
For most of American history, suits for damages against government
officials were at the heart of a constitutional system that prided itself on
government accountability.27 “In the early Republic, an array of
writs . . . allowed individuals to test the legality of government conduct by
filing suit against government officials for money damages payable by the
officer.”28 This not only ensured the accountability of the government and its
agents, but it ensured that every right was met with a corresponding remedy.
Rather than worry about policy concerns, such as whether potential
liability would chill the conduct of government officials, courts focused on
whether rights were violated and, if they were, providing a suitable remedy.29
The legislature’s job, on the other hand, was to weigh policy considerations
and fashion indemnities and immunities to address them.30
This allocation of responsibility allowed each branch to perform its
constitutional duties within the system of checks and balances. Judges, tasked
with deciding cases in law and equity, interpreted the law, evaluated whether
it was violated, and ordered appropriate relief.31 Legislators, in charge of the
government’s purse and matters of public policy, calibrated incentives,
ensuring that government officials were protected from, or subject to,
liability.32

27

See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 656–57 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases beginning in 1765).
28
Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing James E. Pfander &
Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government
Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1871–75 (2010)).
29
See infra Section I.B.
30
See infra Section I.C.
31
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
32
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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A. THE AVAILABILITY OF SUITS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ANIMATED AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

Suits against government officials date back to English common law, 33
where they grew from the maxim, “the king can do no wrong.”34 By the
eighteenth century, courts interpreted that fiction to mean: because the king
was incapable of wrongdoing, any wrong done in the king’s name was
attributable to the individual government officials responsible.35 But those
officials—unlike the king—could be sued.36
At the core of this long tradition was the concern that without
enforcement, there is no accountability, and without accountability, there are
no rights. Thus, in Ashby v. White, the House of Lords allowed a suit for
damages against a commissioner who prevented an individual from voting in
a local election.37 According to Lord Chief Justice Holt, whose dissent the
House of Lords later upheld, the ability to file such a suit would not only
“make publick officers more careful,” but would also vindicate the principle
that if “the plaintiff is obstructed of his right, [he] shall therefore have his
action.”38 “[I]ndeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy.”39
The famous search-and-seizure cases involving Lord Halifax’s general
warrants issued to crack down on John Wilkes and his associates reaffirmed
this precedent.40 These cases upheld jury verdicts in suits for damages to
redress injuries caused by government officials that “violat[ed] Magna
Charta, and attempt[ed] to destroy the liberty of the kingdom.”41

33

Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1963) (“From time immemorial many claims affecting the Crown could be
pursued in the regular courts if they did not take the form of a suit against the Crown . . . .
Long before 1789 it was true that sovereign immunity was not a bar to relief.”).
34
See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1972).
35
Id. at 4.
36
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 237 (1765) (“For
as a king cannot misuse his power, without the advice of evil counsellors, and the assistance
of wicked ministers, these men may be examined and punished.”).
37
Ashby v. White (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 135–36; 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 952–54 (Lord Holt
CJ, dissenting).
38
Id. at 137; 2 Ld. Raym. at 955.
39
Id. at 136; 2 Ld. Raym. at 953.
40
See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1063; Money v. Leach (1765)
97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1088–89; 3 Burr. 1742, 1766–68; Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep.
489, 498–99; Lofft. 1, 17–19; Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768–69; 2 Wils.
K.B. 206, 206–07.
41
Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768–69; 2 Wils. K.B. at 206–07.
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In Entick v. Carrington, perhaps the most famous of these search-andseizure cases, the King’s Chief Messenger broke into the house of John
Wilkes’s associate and under the power of a general warrant searched
through the associate’s home and papers.42 The associate sued for trespass.43
In defense, the messenger argued that the general warrant authorized him “to
seize and apprehend [the associate] and bring together with his books and
papers in safe custody, before the Earl of Halifax.”44 The court dismissed the
general warrant defense and upheld the damages award against both the
messenger and Lord Halifax.45 After all, the general warrant “to seize and
carry away the party’s papers . . . . is illegal and void.”46 Allowing it “would
destroy all the comforts of society” and would violate liberty by subjecting
individuals to “the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the
secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even suspect, a person to be the
author . . . of a seditious libel.”47
Before the American founding, English courts allowed claims for
damages in individual-rights cases.48 Just like their American descendants,
they could not countenance a legal system with rights but no remedies, seeing
civil damages actions as a way to protect fundamental liberties and check
government power.49 “American courts seized this principle of personal
official liability . . . and applied it with unprecedented vigor.”50
B. EARLY AMERICAN COURTS APPLIED STRICT LIABILITY
AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO VIOLATED
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Entick was a “monument of English freedom, undoubtedly familiar to
every American statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and
42

Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1030.
Id.
44
Id. at 1031.
45
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886) (describing the outcome of Entick).
46
Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1074.
47
Id. at 1063, 1066.
48
See, e.g., Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626 (noting that in Entick, John Wilkes “obtained a verdict
of £1,000 against Wood, one of the party who made the search, and £4,000 against Lord
Halifax, the secretary of state, who issued the warrant.”).
49
Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature
of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 531 (2013) (“Federal officials have never
been categorically exempt from damages suits under the common law simply by virtue of their
status as federal officers. From the beginning of the nation’s history, federal (and state)
officials have been subject to common-law suits as if they were private individuals, just as
English officials were at the time of the Founding.”).
50
Engdahl, supra note 34, at 14.
43
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considered to be the true and ultimate expression of constitutional
law . . . .”51 From its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court regarded
“effective judicial redress for positive governmental wrongs” “as paramount
and essential to American constitutional government . . . .”52 This redress
was achieved through various common-law causes of action against
responsible government officials, including trespass and assumpsit, both of
which resulted in the entry of judgment for money damages.53 The rule was
strict and did not spare even officers who acted in good faith or under
orders.54 If a public official violated the law, he was answerable in damages
without exception for reasonableness or good faith.55 That rule—like its
English counterpart—grew out of agency principles and the recognition that
sovereign immunity demanded individual official liability to ensure that
rights had corresponding remedies.56
The historical rule of strict liability is perhaps best displayed in the
famous case of Little v. Barreme.57 On December 2, 1799, U.S. Navy Captain
George Little seized the Danish vessel the Flying-Fish as it was en route from
a French port.58 Captain Little was acting on the orders of President John
Adams, but those orders hinged on a statutory misconstruction and the
seizure was, thus, unauthorized by law.59 The owner of the vessel sued for its
return and damages from Captain Little.60 The federal district court ordered
51
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)).
52
Engdahl, supra note 34, at 27; see also, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”).
53
See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1874; James E. Pfander & David
Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117,
134 (2009) (“[F]or much of the nation’s history, state common law provided victims with a
right of action that, although somewhat cumbersome, could eventually result in a vindication
of their constitutional rights. For example, the victim of an unlawful search might sue the
responsible federal official for a trespass.”).
54
See Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It
Changed, and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 145–48 (2012); id. at 147
(“[I]mmunizing an officer from damages is a way of authorizing or ‘legalizing’ his conduct,
and because the enumeration principle prohibits an unconstitutional act from being ‘legalized,’
it also prohibited immunizing an officer from damages.”).
55
See Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 396, 414–22 (1987).
56
See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 19.
57
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
58
Id. at 178.
59
Id. at 170.
60
Id. at 176.
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the vessel returned but declined to award damages. On appeal, the circuit
court reversed and entered judgment for more than $8,500 against Captain
Little (about $130,000 today).61 The Supreme Court affirmed on certiorari,
declaring: “A commander of a ship of war of the United States, in obeying
his instructions from the President of the United States, acts at his peril. If
those instructions are not strictly warranted by law he is answerable in
damages to any person injured by their execution.”62
The unforgiving rule prompted Chief Justice Marshall to admit that his
“first bias” was “in favor of the opinion that though instructions of the
executive could not give a right, they might yet excuse from damages.” 63
Ultimately, the Court refused to consider a policy-driven exception. It
focused instead on the lawfulness of government conduct, since attenuating
circumstances, like good faith on the part of the officer, could not “change
the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without [such
attenuating circumstances] would have been a plain trespass.” Congress later
mitigated Captain Little’s harsh consequences by passing private legislation
to indemnify him from damages.64
Two fundamental concepts are central to this founding government
accountability principle: the importance of redress and the separation of
powers.
The first concept hardly needs explanation. As William Blackstone
famously proclaimed—in words like those of Lord Chief Justice Holt in
Ashby—without a method for “recovering and asserting” fundamental rights,
“in vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed.”65 The
Supreme Court cited a similar quote from Blackstone in Marbury v. Madison:
“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there
is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded.”66 Consonant with that principle, federal courts ordered redress by
the government, including through judgments for money damages, payable
by the responsible official well into the twentieth century.67 The Court
61

Engdahl, supra note 34, at 14; Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1877–81.
Little, 6 U.S. at 170 (italics omitted).
63
Id. at 179.
64
See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1900–03.
65
BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 55–56.
66
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
67
See, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20–21 (1940) (admitting
plaintiffs can sue federal officers for damages if they exceed their authority or the claimed
authority is not within the government’s constitutional power to confer); Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619–20 (1912) (“The exemption of the United States from suit does
not protect its officers from personal liability to persons whose rights of property they have
62
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emphasized that an alternative framework, in which “courts cannot give
remedy when the citizen has been deprived of [his rights] by force” would
go against the nation’s character and would “sanction[] a tyranny which has
no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which
has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal
rights.”68
The second concept—fidelity to the separation of powers—was perhaps
best articulated by Justice Story in The Apollon. There, he distinguished the
judicial role from the legislative by writing that the judiciary “cannot enter
into political considerations, on points of national policy . . . .”69 The Court’s
“duty lies in a more narrow compass; and we must administer the laws as
they exist, without straining them to reach public mischiefs . . . .”70 As a
result, “this Court can only look to the questions, whether the laws have been
violated; and if they were, justice demands, that the injured party should
receive a suitable redress.”71 It was not the judiciary’s job to perform policy
analyses and adjust the incentives of government officials by providing them
with protections from liability.72 That was the legislature’s province.73
Tracy v. Swartwout aptly demonstrates both ideas.74 There, importers of
sugarcane syrup sued a New York customs collector for demanding they pay
much higher taxes on the import than those owed.75 Because the importers
could not afford the payment, the collector seized the syrup and kept it “for
a long time,” causing deterioration in value.76 When the importers sued for

wrongfully invaded.”); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896) (reasoning federal officers
can be “personally liable to an action of tort by a private person whose rights of property they
have wrongfully invaded or injured, even by authority of the United States”); Bates v. Clark,
95 U.S. 204, 209 (1877) (holding federal officers personally liable for wrongfully seizing
private property under official orders); cf. Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 344 (1865)
(explaining that an officer in “the exercise of his judgment and discretion . . . is legally
responsible to any person for the consequences of any error or mistake”).
68
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 221 (1882).
69
The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 366 (1824).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 367.
72
See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1870.
73
See The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 366–67 (reasoning that the role of the courts is to analyze
legal claims; the Legislature “will doubtless apply a proper indemnity” if good public policy
requires); see also Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1868–69 (“[P]erhaps as early as 1804,
when the Marshall Court decided Little and Murray [v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804)], and certainly by 1836, the Supreme Court simply assumed that indemnity
was routinely available to take the sting out of any official liability.”).
74
See generally Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1836).
75
See id. at 93, 95.
76
Id. at 93.
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damages, the customs collector defended himself by claiming he acted in
good faith and in compliance with the Secretary of the Treasury’s
instructions.77
The Court rejected the collector’s defense, making it clear that its
concern lay with enforcing the law: “It would be a most dangerous principle
to establish, that the acts of a ministerial officer, when done in good faith,
however injurious to private rights, and unsupported by law, should afford
no ground for legal redress.”78 But the Court also emphasized that even
though it was holding the customs officer responsible in damages “for illegal
acts done under instructions of a superior . . . the government [Congress] in
such cases is bound to indemnify the officer.”79 In other words, the Court in
Tracy found that courts do the legal work by deciding whether the
government conduct was unlawful and, if so, awarding appropriate relief;
Congress does the policy work by determining whether indemnification or
immunity is warranted.
C. CONGRESS HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED POLICY IN
DETERMINING THE NEED FOR INDEMNITY AND IMMUNITY
FROM DAMAGES

On the other side of the constitutional ledger, Congress did not wade
into damages. Instead, it dealt with immunity and indemnity.80 As James
Madison described it, “injuries committed on aliens as well as citizens, ought
to be carried in the first instance at least, before the tribunal to which the
aggressors are responsible . . . .”81 But once the courts determined that a right
was violated and ordered damages against the responsible officer, it was then
up to Congress to decide whether to shield the officer from liability as a
matter of public policy.82
77

Id.
Id.
79
Id.
80
See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1873 & n.45 (“Leading thinkers of the day agreed
that, from the perspective of the separation of government powers, the task of adjudicating
money claims against the government was one that the courts should perform.”).
81
Letter from James Madison to Peder Blicherolsen (Apr. 23, 1802), in 3 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON: SECRETARY OF STATE SERIES 152 (D.B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Jeanne Kerr
Cross & Susan Holbrook Perdue eds., 1995).
82
The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 366–67 (1824):
78

It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the high discretion confided to the
executive, for great purposes, to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief,
by summary measures, which are not found in the text of the laws. Such measures are properly
matters of state, and if the responsibility is taken, under justifiable circumstances, the Legislature
will doubtless apply a proper indemnity.
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Congress did not shy away from this role. Between 1789 and 1860,
Congress evaluated fifty-seven petitions of officers held liable in court.83 It
granted some form of indemnification to officers in thirty-six of these fiftyseven petitions, with its determinations focusing on whether the officer acted
in good faith and without malice and whether he followed government
instructions.84
If an officer acted outside the scope of his agency and without
attenuating circumstances, as shown in Joel Burt’s case, Congress would not
offer indemnity.85 If Congress found that an officer performed his duties with
“a strict adherence to the letter of his instructions, with a laudable zeal, and
with all good faith,”86 like in the case of Nathaniel Mitchell,87 then Congress
indemnified.88 By doing so, Congress calibrated incentives for government
officials by encouraging fervent pursuit of official duties, while also making
sure that pursuit could not veer outside the scope of those duties.
Along with indemnity, Congress provided narrow statutory immunities
for certain officers who acted in good faith. For example, in 1789, Congress
passed the Collection Act, which allowed courts to absolve collectors of
83

Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1904.
Id. at 1905–06; see also id. at 1905 (“The forms of relief varied. Some private bills were
structured as direct payments to the petitioning government officers; others were structured as
payments to the victims of government misconduct.”).
85
Burt served as the collector for one of New York’s ports when he arbitrarily refused a
shipment of potash from his port to go to another port in New York because the collector there
would permit the potash to enter Canada and violate the Embargo Act. See Pfander & Hunt,
supra note 28, at 1907. A New York State court ordered $1,500 in damages against Burt, who
petitioned Congress for indemnification. Id. The House of Representatives repeatedly denied
Burt the indemnity, eventually explaining that “[i]t should not be the policy of the United
States to screen their officers from making a just renumeration for losses sustained by her
citizens, when the acts of such officers are illegal, unjust, and without palliating
circumstances.” H.R. REP. NO. 24-255, at 1 (1836).
86
H.R. REP. NO. 25-780, at 3 (1838).
87
Mitchell was the postmaster in Portland, Maine, when his superiors tasked him with
investigating missing letters containing money. Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 442–44
(1836). Mitchell set up a trap by putting several test packages in the mail. Id. Because one of
these packages did not reach its destination, Mitchell concluded that his assistant postmaster
William Merriam was the culprit and initiated a criminal investigation against Merriam. Id.
The missing package eventually turned up, and a grand jury declined to indict Merriam. Id. at
445–46. Merriam sued Mitchell for malicious prosecution and requested damages. Id. at 439–
40. When the jury awarded $1,666 to Merriam and the Maine Supreme Court upheld the
verdict, Mitchell petitioned Congress for indemnification. Id. at 441, 458; H.R. REP. NO.
25-780, at 2 (1838). His petition succeeded. According to a House committee’s report,
Mitchell simply followed instructions and performed his duties in good faith. Id. at 3. The
House appropriated $2,392.21 to cover the judgment against him, plus costs and fees. Act for
the Relief of Nathaniel Mitchell, ch. 48, 6 Stat. 754 (1839).
88
See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1909.
84
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liability, despite adverse jury verdicts, upon finding reasonable cause for a
seizure.89 That same act allowed officers to recover double their costs if the
plaintiff lost the suit.90 Similarly, in a 1799 revenue law, Congress established
a reasonable cause defense in certain forfeiture cases, so long as the vessel or
merchandise was restored to the claimants.91
During the Civil War, Congress adopted legislation immunizing federal
officers from liability for “any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment” made
under a presidential order.92
By passing these immunity provisions, Congress—just as in the
examples involving indemnity—weighed policy considerations to encourage
vigorous pursuit of official duties, discourage rogue behavior, and prevent
baseless lawsuits. Congress left remedy questions to courts but ensured that
under certain circumstances remedies did not prove counterproductive to
government policy goals.
For at least a century and a half after the founding, the allocation of
responsibility between Congress and the courts was simple. Courts did law
by analyzing whether the conduct by the government officer was illegal and,
if so, ordering damages. Congress did policy by carefully adjusting
incentives that led to the best outcome.

89

See Jerry Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations,
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1330 (2006).
90
Id.
91
Id.; An Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage, ch. 22, 1 Stat.
627, 696 (1799).
92
Amanda Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 640 (2009).
Still, Congress’ role as policymaker was limited by its constitutional authority. It could not,
therefore, create immunities that would permit the violation of constitutional rights. See also
Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 640 (1884) (emphasis added) (“That an act passed after the
event, which, in effect, ratifies what has been done, and declares that no suit shall be sustained
against the party acting under color of authority, is valid, so far as congress could have
conferred such authority before, admits of no reasonable doubt.”);
Congress may provide for indemnifying those who, in great emergencies, acting under pressing
necessities for the public, invade private rights in support of the authority of the government; but
between acts of indemnity in such cases and the attempt to deprive the citizen of his right to
compensation for wrongs committed against him or his property, or to enforce contract
obligations, there is a wide difference, which cannot be disregarded without a plain violation of
the constitution.

id. at 649 (Field, J., dissenting); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 373 (1863) (“The question
here arises, then, can Congress enact that the citizen shall have no redress for a violation of
his rights, secured to him by the . . . Constitution . . . . These sections prohibit the passage of
a law by Congress, authorizing the arrest of the citizen, without just cause, because such arrest
deprives him of his liberty.”).
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D. THE HISTORICAL RULE OF STRICT LIABILITY WAS THE LAW
OF THE LAND IN 1871 WHEN CONGRESS ENACTED SECTION
1983, AND COURTS CONTINUOUSLY ENFORCED IT WELL INTO
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The historical rule of strict liability continued in force throughout the
nineteenth century,93 including when Congress enacted the 1871 Ku Klux
Klan Act in the wake of the Civil War and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Designed to provide remedies for constitutional violations in
the post-war South, the Act created a civil cause of action against any person
who, under color of state law, deprives another “of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”94 That provision—now
commonly known as “Section 1983” (for its codification at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983)—would become “one of the most well-known civil rights statutes”
in the United States.95
Congress included no exceptions in Section 1983’s text.96 And it was
well established that none existed outside the statute either.97 The historical

93
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851) (“Consequently the
order given was an order to do an illegal act; to commit a trespass upon the property of another;
and can afford no justification to the person by whom it was executed.”); Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46 (1849) (“[I]f the power is exercised for the purposes of oppression, or
any injury wilfully [sic] done to person or property, the party by whom, or by whose order, it
is committed would undoubtedly be answerable.”); Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
137, 156–58 (1836); Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 93 (1836); Wise v. Withers, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 337 (1806); see also Max P. Rapacz, Protection of Officers Who Act
Under Unconstitutional Statutes, 11 MINN. L. REV. 585, 585 (1927) (“Prior to 1880 there
seems to have been absolute uniformity in holding officers liable for injuries resulting from
the enforcement of unconstitutional acts.”).
94
An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
95
Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 490 (2020).
96
See supra note 94 [(“[A]ny person who, under color of any law . . . of any State, shall
subject . . . . any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . shall, any such law . . .
notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress[.]”).
97
In some specialized areas of law, exceptions were made. For instance, citing its
“conscientious discretion” when defining rules of capture in admiralty law, the Supreme Court
declined to “introduce a rule harsh and severe in a case of first impression” where a lieutenant
in the Navy had justifiably captured a Portuguese ship but questions remained over whether
he was obligated to release the ship once he discovered that it was not involved in piracy. The
Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 54–56 (1825). Even so, The Marianna Flora did not
announce or apply a general defense or immunity.
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rule of strict liability prevailed throughout this period.98 In rejecting a request
for individual immunity in 1882, Justice Miller powerfully extolled:
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may
set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy,
and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which
it gives.99

The availability of claims against government officials continued
through the end of the nineteenth century.100 In Poindexter v. Greenhow, for
instance, the Supreme Court held a government official personally liable for
acting under a Virginia law later declared unconstitutional.101 Poindexter
rejected the official’s plea for immunity, holding that to grant it would
“obliterate[] the line of demarcation that separates constitutional government
from absolutism, free self-government based on the sovereignty of the people
from that despotism . . . which enables the agent of the state to declare and
decree that he is the state.”102 If “judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit
penalties upon individual offenders” “principles of individual liberty and
right [cannot] be maintained.”103 Poindexter explicitly rejected the
consideration of public policy in reaching its holding.104
The Supreme Court continued to apply the strict rule into the twentieth
century, focusing, instead, on individual rights. In the 1915 Myers v.
Anderson decision, the Court affirmed a Section 1983 judgment against
Maryland election officials who prevented three black men from voting

98

See Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 648–49 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting); see also
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND
MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE, WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND FOREIGN
LAW § 320 (5th ed. 1857) (reasoning that it is not enough for government officials to simply
act “bonâ fide, and to the best of their skill and judgment . . . .”).
99
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
100
See Note, Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and Its
Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 832 (1957) (“A government officer who acts without
authority is thus subject to the same legal rules as any private person.”).
101
See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 297 (1885).
102
Id. at 291.
103
Id.; see also Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896) (rejecting an official’s defense
of reasonableness); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 209 (1877) (rejecting an official’s defense of
good faith).
104
See Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 297 (permitting individual claims “no matter how much
their determination may incidentally and consequentially affect the interests of a state, or the
operations of its government”).
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under an unconstitutional state statute.105 The officers argued that they should
not be held liable because they believed, in good faith, that the statute was
constitutional.106 But Myers rejected that argument.107 Instead, it affirmed the
circuit court’s holding—echoing Little—that anyone enforcing an
unconstitutional law “does so at his known peril and is made liable to an
action for damages.”108
Through strict liability, eighteenth and early-nineteenth century courts
centuries hewed to their judicial role: doing law. When asked to excuse
government officials from liability for one reason or another, the Supreme
Court uniformly refused—no matter the quality of the excuse.109 To stray
beyond law would force courts to “enter into political considerations, on
points of national policy,” which the Court proclaimed it would not do.110 At
least for a time.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S CREATION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY BROKE
WITH CENTURIES OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND SWAPPED
THE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ROLES

For two centuries, American courts diligently focused on determining
whether rights were violated and, if so, ordering a remedy.111 Everything else
was left for the political branches to address. But the Supreme Court
abandoned the principles of accountability by creating broad immunities to
official liability, beginning in 1967.
A. IN 1967, THE COURT ANNOUNCED AN EXCEPTION TO STRICT
LIABILITY BY SHIELDING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO
ACTED REASONABLY AND IN GOOD FAITH

In 1967, the Supreme Court disclaimed the historical rule of strict
liability and drastically changed the law in Pierson v. Ray.112 There, the Court
105

See Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 377–78 (1915).
See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 57
(2018) (citing the officials’ briefing).
107
See Myers, 238 U.S. at 378.
108
Anderson v. Myers, 182 F. 223, 230 (C.C.D. Md. 1910).
109
See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (“[T]he [president’s wartime]
instructions [to a military officer] cannot . . . legalize an act which without those instructions
would have been a plain trespass.”).
110
The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 366 (1824).
111
See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 491 (2020) (noting that common-law causes of
action against government officials “remained available through the 19th century and into the
20th.”).
112
See 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). Ahead of Pierson, scholars and commentators in the
twentieth century began to question the fairness of strict official liability, shifting the
106
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addressed whether Mississippi police were liable under Section 1983 for
having unreasonably seized a group of anti-segregationist ministers in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.113 Although the officers acted under a
Mississippi statute, that statute was later ruled unconstitutional.114
Under the historical rule, the officers would have been personally
liable.115 But Pierson held they were not. Instead, the Court shielded the
officers from liability under a newly announced general “defense of good
faith and probable cause,” which the Court imported from the common-law
tort of false arrest.116 The creation of a good faith defense to liability
represented a major shift in the jurisprudence. It meant that “the officer
obedient to an invalid order or executing an invalid law [wa]s . . . protected
from personal liability by his good faith,” making “the law of personal
official liability . . . radically different and more favorable to the officer
. . . than nineteenth century lawyers ever conceived it to be.”117
But the Court in Pierson seemingly envisioned only minor
consequences from its shift.118 Indeed, cases that followed emphasized that
the requirement of good faith would not allow bad actors to go unpunished.119
Government officials who acted in bad faith were always liable, and even
government officials who acted in good faith were liable unless their actions
were also reasonable.120 Without both safeguards, constitutional guarantees
discussion from legality to morality. Kian, supra note 54, at 151. And “[b]y the
1920s . . . states had begun expanding official immunity to executive officers.” Id. at 153.
113
Pierson, 368 U.S. at 548–51.
114
See id. at 554–57; see also Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524, 524 (1965) (mem.)
(holding the Mississippi statute unconstitutional under similar facts).
115
See, e.g., Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 378–79 (1915); Poindexter v. Greenhow,
114 U.S. 270, 291 (1885).
116
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556; see also Baude, supra note 106, at 52–53 (explaining and
commenting on Pierson’s stated justification for creating a new general defense to Section
1983 claims).
117
Engdahl, supra note 34, at 55.
118
See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555 (describing the defense as a response to the claim that
police officers “should not be liable if they acted in good faith and with probable cause in
making an arrest under a statute that they believed to be valid”). Notably, Pierson’s
forgiveness of the officers for their reliance on an unconstitutional statute was not only
inconsistent with earlier cases, see, e.g., Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 297 (1885),
but also inconsistent with the text of Section 1983 as enacted, see supra notes 94, 96. That text
explicitly made government officials liable for the deprivation of rights “any such law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding . . . .” Id.
(emphasis added).
119
See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (requiring that an “official
himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right”).
120
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 484 (1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555, 562 (1978); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (“[T]he relevant question
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would be a matter of judicial grace—“[a]ny lesser standard would deny much
of the promise of [Section] 1983.”121
B. WITH THE CREATION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN 1982, THE
SUPREME COURT ERASED THE HISTORICAL RULE OF STRICT
LIABILITY AND SHIELDED EVEN BAD-FAITH ACTORS FROM
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR LAWLESS CONDUCT

With its decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court created
the qualified immunity doctrine, which removed good faith from the analysis
and converted official liability from the general rule to the rare exception.
1. By Announcing the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity, the Court
Acted as a Policymaking Body
In an act of judicial policymaking, Harlow v. Fitzgerald discarded the
historical standards of liability and replaced them with qualified immunity in
1982.122 No statutory enactment or constitutional amendment precipitated
that radical shift. Harlow simply did policy.123
In Harlow, a federal whistleblower named A. Ernest Fitzgerald brought
First Amendment retaliation claims against members of the Nixon
Administration, Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield.124 Both men
allegedly terminated Fitzgerald’s position as a contractor with the U.S. Air
Force because he testified about cost overruns in a Pentagon weapons
program.125 Fitzgerald brought his claims through an implied cause of action
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of

for the jury is whether O’Connor ‘knew or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of
[Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson].’”) (citation omitted); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974) (“It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed
at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a
basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official
conduct.”).
121
Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
122
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982).
123
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992) (“[A]s our precedents make clear, the reasons
for recognizing such an immunity were based not simply on the existence of a good faith
defense at common law, but on the special policy concerns involved in suing government
officials.”).
124
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802–06.
125
Fitzgerald also sued President Nixon in the companion case, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731 (1982), where his claims were met with absolute immunity.
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Narcotics.126 Weighing the “competing values” of constitutional guarantees
against litigation costs,127 Harlow concluded that it was too costly to require
government officials like Harlow and Butterfield to establish good faith for
their unlawful acts.128 So the Court struck that requirement and converted
liability from the rule to the exception, pronouncing: “[G]overnment officials
. . . generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.”129
Following Harlow, all government officials—state, federal, and local—
are, by default, entitled to a “qualified immunity” from suit.130 Unlike most
defenses, qualified immunity places the burden on the plaintiff, not the
defendant invoking the defense.131 And the availability of immunity is only
rebuttable, and therefore “qualified,” if a plaintiff can prove two things: the
“violation of a constitutional right” and that the right was “clearly
established” when the alleged misconduct occurred.132
Harlow worked a revolution in official liability for unlawful acts.
Although the Court’s earlier decisions creating and applying sweeping goodfaith immunities had purportedly rested on defenses “historically accorded
126

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971).
127

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–16; accord id. at 817 (“Judicial inquiry into subjective
motivation . . . may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons,
including an official’s professional colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly
disruptive of effective government.”) (citations omitted).
128
Among the costs the Court factored into its policy decision were that “claims
frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty[,]” “expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,” “the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office[,]” and “the danger that [the] fear of being sued will dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.” Id. at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129
Id. at 818.
130
On similar policy grounds, the Court applied qualified immunity to state and local
officials, even though Harlow involved federal officials and, more importantly, Section 1983
“on its face admits of no immunities.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986). Giving
short shrift to the holes in its legal reasoning, the Court again reverted to policy, explaining
that it would be “untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits
brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution
against federal officials.” Id. at 340 n.2 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30).
131
See, e.g., Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[P]laintiff bears
the burden of showing that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.”).
132
See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 230–33 (2009); Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d
998, 1004 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (“[W]hen
this defense is raised, the onus is on the plaintiff to demonstrate ‘(1) that the official violated
a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time
of the challenged conduct.’”).
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the relevant official at common law,”133 Harlow “completely reformulated
qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common
law . . . .”134 Rather than focusing on the judicial enforcement of individual
rights, the Court waded into policy by designing a test for “objective inquiry
into the legal reasonableness of the official action.”135 Through Harlow, the
Court erased two centuries of case law that consistently held government
officials liable for their unlawful acts. In its place, Harlow enshrined an
immunity that consistently shields them from liability.136
133

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976).
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). For this reason and others, qualified
immunity has been consistently criticized by legal scholars and jurists. See generally, e.g.,
Baude, supra note 106; Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869–72 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 26 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Still,
a handful of scholars have begun offering defenses of some aspects of the doctrine. See
generally Andrew S. Oldham, Official Immunity at the Founding (April 12, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824983 [https://perma.cc/MN6H-2374]
(Judge Oldham’s Article does not deal with the main historical criticism of qualified
immunity: that in the absence of a statutory intervention, the common law operates without
any qualified immunity defenses. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1881–87); Scott A.
Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1368–77
(2021) (Keller’s Article only addresses common-law deference to the exercise of lawful
discretion by government officials. It does not undermine the argument that when these
officials exceeded the scope of their discretion, or violated individual rights, there was no
immunity to protect them. See generally James E. Pfander, Zones of Discretion at Common
Law, 116 NW. L. REV. ONLINE 148 (2021); William Baude, Is Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Qualified Immunity?, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2021)); Aaron L. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1853 (2018). Ultimately, even the defenders of qualified immunity agree that Harlow was
unmoored from legal principle or history, but further discussion of the specific debates over
official immunity goes beyond the scope of this Article.
135
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 645; see also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)
(acknowledging that the clearly established test is designed to “protect[] the balance between
vindication of constitutional rights and government officials’ effective performance of their
duties”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But one of the core purposes of the strict liability
observed at the time of the founding and the passage of Section 1983 was explicitly to limit
the performance of duties to ensure that those duties never swerved out of their constitutional
guiderails. Engdahl, supra note 34, at 34 (“The genius of the principle of personal official
liability as it had been developed during the nineteenth century was precisely that it did
provide a means of enforcing the governments’ compliance with legal and constitutional
limit[s]—indirectly, but effectively enough—despite the principles of government[]
immunity.”).
136
Harlow’s reliance on policy also highlights the practical issues with that approach, as
justices immediately began fighting over who should be entitled to immunity and to what
degree. See Woolhandler, supra note 55, at 396–97 n.1. Compare, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner,
474 U.S. 193, 203–04 (1985) (providing qualified immunity to members of a federal prison’s
discipline committee), with id. at 212 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing members should be
given absolute immunity); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985) (providing qualified
134
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2. The Court has Expanded Qualified Immunity by Repeatedly
Restricting the Definition of Clearly Established Law
Following Harlow, the Court incrementally but consistently increased
the category of unlawful acts for which officials are immune by restricting
the definition of “clearly established” law needed to overcome qualified
immunity.137 At first, plaintiffs had to show that the “contours” of a right
were “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates that right.”138
By the late 1990s, plaintiffs seeking to overcome qualified immunity
not only had to show that a reasonable officer would have known the act was
unlawful but point to “controlling authority in their jurisdiction” or a
“consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”139
Soon, on-point authority became insufficient. By the 2000s, even when
plaintiffs could point to controlling authority in their circuit, “[the] inquiry
[had to] be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a
broad general proposition.”140
immunity to the attorney general), with id. at 536–37 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating
presidential aids should have absolute immunity in the area of national security), and id. at
540 (Stevens, J., concurring) (same); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749–53 (1982)
(providing absolute immunity to the president for his official acts), with id. at 764–70, 785–
92, 797 (White, J. dissenting) (arguing the president should only have qualified immunity for
unlawful dismissal of employees); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807–13 (1982)
(creating qualified immunity for presidential aids), with id. at 822–29 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating presidential aides should have absolute immunity because congressional
aids do). That debate continued. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 159 (1992) (denying
qualified immunity to private attorney) with id. at 175–77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
private attorney should be granted qualified immunity).
137
The Supreme Court has also magnified the effect of qualified immunity on civil rights
litigation in several other key ways that benefit the government and disadvantage plaintiffs.
For instance, in Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 530, the Court announced that the denial of qualified
immunity was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. That procedural
giveaway allows government defendants to greatly increase the costs of litigation through
lengthy and repeated appeals. See generally Michael E. Solimine, Are Interlocutory Qualified
Immunity Appeals Lawful?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 169 (2019) (arguing that the
availability of immediate interlocutory appeals for the denial of qualified immunity is dubious
on doctrinal, functional, and institutional grounds). And in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009), the Court announced that lower courts could decide qualified immunity without
ever addressing the underlying constitutional violation. Cf. Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457,
479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willet, J., concurring) (“[T]he inexorable result is ‘constitutional
stagnation’—fewer courts establishing law at all, much less clearly doing so. Section 1983
meets Catch-22.”) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court itself has only reached the
constitutional merits in nine of its 27 decisions granting qualified immunity. See Appendix.
138
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citations omitted).
139
See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
140
See Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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Today, plaintiffs must show that it is “beyond debate” that a question of
law is clearly established in the relevant circuit.141 Although the Supreme
Court has stated that plaintiffs need not show that “the very action in question
has previously been held unlawful,”142 the Court has repeatedly cautioned the
lower courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of
generality.”143 Presently, “[t]he pages of the United States Reports teem with
warnings about the difficulty of placing a question beyond debate.”144
3. Qualified Immunity now Regularly Facilitates Egregious
Constitutional Violations
The Court in Harlow sensed its ruling would cause concern and
promised that “[b]y defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in
objective terms, [the Court] provide[s] no license to lawless conduct.”145 In
Malley v. Briggs, the Court also assured that qualified immunity’s “ample
protection” would not extend to “the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”146 Those assurances were hollow.
Nearly forty years later, qualified immunity routinely shields both the
plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law. To
demonstrate, consider some of the qualified immunity cases the Court
collected for its May 25, 2020 conference, but ultimately declined to hear.147
In those cases, qualified immunity was granted to:
 Police officers who stole more than $225,000;148
 A police officer who shot a ten-year-old child, while repeatedly trying
to shoot a nonthreatening family dog;149

141

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (citation omitted).
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615.
143
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).
144
Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019).
145
Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
146
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
147
See infra Part III.
148
Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937, 939–40, 942 (9th Cir. 2019). Although none
of the cases in this list went to trial because of qualified immunity, we—as the courts that
awarded qualified immunity had to—treat their allegations as true. One of the more obscure
costs of qualified immunity is that it prevents government officials from being exonerated at
trial. Instead, courts treat them as if they have committed the unlawful acts alleged and shield
them anyhow.
149
See Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2019).
142
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 Police officers who fired gas grenades into a woman’s home, despite
her providing her keys and permission to enter the home to look for a
suspect who was not there;150
 Medical board officials who searched a doctor’s medical records
without a warrant;151
 A police officer who spent more than ninety minutes peering into the
windows of a home, flashing his lights and blaring his siren in the
driveway, beating on the door, and doing various other things to force
a resident to submit to a breathalyzer test;152
 A police officer who body slammed a nonthreatening woman and
broke her collarbone as she walked away from him;153
 Police officers who allowed their dog to bite a suspect who had
surrendered;154
 Police officers who tased a man multiple times before he lost
consciousness and later died;155 and
 A department of education superintendent who denied a charter
school application to an organization based on the protected speech
of the organization’s CEO.156
Thanks to Harlow and its progeny, American courts now permit these
and many, many other governmental wrongs for which officials would have
faced liability between 1789 and 1981.
The increasingly muscular application of qualified immunity by the
circuit courts can be explained, at least in part, by the Supreme Court’s
routine reversal of circuit decisions denying qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity cases occupy an outsized proportion of the Supreme Court’s
docket, and the Court rarely grants certiorari to deny qualified immunity, but
does frequently grant certiorari to allow it.157 Moreover, although summary
reversal is an “extraordinary remedy” meant for only “manifestly incorrect”
decisions,158 the Court routinely applies that remedy to circuit court decisions
that allow government officials to face liability for unconstitutional acts by

150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

See West v. City of Caldwell, 931 F.3d 978, 981–82, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2019).
See Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 462, 470 (5th Cir. 2019).
See Brennan v. Dawson, 752 F. App’x 276, 278–79 (6th Cir. 2018).
See Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975, 978–79, 982 (8th Cir. 2019).
See Baxter v. Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869, 870 (6th Cir. 2018).
See Cooper v. Flaig, 779 F. App’x 269, 270, 270–72 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
See Clarkston v. White, 943 F.3d 988, 990–93 (5th Cir. 2019).
See Baude, supra note 106, at 82–83.
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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denying qualified immunity.159 As a result, circuit courts have grown to
consider it their obligation to “think twice before denying qualified
immunity.”160
Similarly, the Supreme Court has nearly always sided with qualified
immunity. In the 39 years since it decided Harlow, the Supreme Court has
considered the clearly established test thirty-six times.161 It has only found
that a government official violated clearly established law three times: in
Groh v. Ramirez162 and Hope v. Pelzer163 more than a decade ago, and Taylor
v. Riojas in November 2020.164
In 1967, the Supreme Court created a general defense of good faith that
would expand into the doctrine of qualified immunity courts apply today.165
Over the past 53 years, the trend of Supreme Court precedent has consistently
favored granting immunity in a growing number of circumstances.166 But
three decisions from the Court’s 2020 term indicate that it may be breaking
with that trend. In Taylor v. Riojas and McCoy v. Alamu, the Court pared
back the application of the clearly established test—holding that qualified
immunity cannot forgive obvious constitutional violations.167 And in Tanzin
v. Tanvir the Court rejected the policy arguments Harlow cited to create
qualified immunity in the first place.168 Taken together, Taylor, McCoy, and

159
See Appendix (noting summary reversals with a dagger). More than one-third of the
Court’s qualified immunity decisions are summary reversals (13 of 36), and only one, Taylor
v. Riojas resulted in a denial of immunity. As of 2014, the Roberts Court summarily reversed
an average of 6.2% of its cases. See William Baude, Foreward: The Supreme Court’s Shadow
Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1, 30 (2015). But when it comes to addressing qualified
immunity, the Roberts Court has used summary reversal in 45.8% of its decision (11 of 24).
See Appendix.
160
See Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 2019).
161
See infra Appendix.
162
See 540 U.S. 551, 565 (2004).
163
See 536 U.S. 730, 744 (2002).
164
See 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020) (per curiam). In 2018, the Supreme Court reversed a grant
of qualified immunity in Sause v. Bauer, a case where the plaintiff alleged police stopped her
from praying. 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2562 (2018) (per curiam). But the Court did not address the
clearly established test. Instead, it simply reversed the lower court’s decision because they had
failed to properly construe the allegations in the plaintiff’s pro se complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and so the Court could not address whether qualified immunity
applied. Id. at 2563. That case and others concerning qualified immunity that were decided on
procedural grounds without consideration of the clearly established test are not included in the
Appendix.
165
See supra Section II.A.
166
See supra Section II.B.
167
See infra Section III.A.
168
See infra Section III.B.
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Tanzin suggest a different trend: that the Court may be recalibrating qualified
immunity, if not reconsidering the doctrine entirely.
III. THREE RECENT DECISIONS SIGNAL THAT THE SUPREME COURT MAY
BE ON ITS WAY TO RECALIBRATING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The Supreme Court has been unquestionably steadfast in its prodefendant application of Harlow’s clearly established standard and, until its
2020 term, it showed no signs of wavering. Even near the end of its 2019
term, against the backdrop of demonstrations calling for increased police
accountability following the killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor,
the Supreme Court rejected thirteen petitions urging the reconsideration of
qualified immunity.169 Only Justice Thomas dissented, outlining his “doubts
about our qualified immunity jurisprudence” and its faithfulness to American
legal history.170 But several of the Court’s recent decisions suggest that it
may finally be coming to appreciate that qualified immunity is flawed in both
practice and theory. The Court’s decisions in Taylor and McCoy171 address
the former, its decision in Tanzin addresses the latter.
It is impossible to understand these decisions’ significance, however,
without first dealing with Hope v. Pelzer,172 one of the most important
Supreme Court precedents rejecting qualified immunity. In that case,
Alabama prison inmate Larry Hope sued prison guards after they staked him,
shirtless, to a hitching post in the hot sun for seven hours.173 Prison officials
denied Hope bathroom breaks and only gave him water once or twice.174 At
one point a guard taunted Hope by giving water to dogs and kicking over a

169
See Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 141 S. Ct. 110 (2020) (mem.); Baxter v. Bracey,
140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) (mem.); Brennan v. Dawson, 141 S. Ct. 108 (2020) (mem.); Clarkston
v. White, 140 S. Ct. 2763 (2020) (mem.); Cooper v. Flaig, 141 S. Ct. 131 (2020) (mem.);
Corbitt v. Vickers, 141 S. Ct. 110 (2020) (mem.); Davis v. Ermold, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020) (mem.);
Hunter v. Cole, 141 S. Ct. 111 (2020) (mem.); Jessop v. City of Fresno, 140 S. Ct. 2793 (2020)
(mem.); Kelsay v. Ernst, 140 S. Ct. 2760 (2020) (mem.); Mason v. Faul, 141 S. Ct. 116 (2020)
(mem.); West v. Winfield, 141 S. Ct. 111 (2020) (mem.); Zadeh v. Robinson, 141 S. Ct. 110
(2020) (mem.).
170
Baxter, 140 S. Ct. at 1862–65 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
171
Because McCoy is a summary order, granting, vacating, and remanding (GVR) the
Fifth Circuit’s decision, it is not included in the list of cases in which the Court has addressed
the clearly established test. See infra Appendix. Neither are the many cases the Court has
GVRed in favor of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Hunter v. Cole, 137 S. Ct. 497 (2016)
(mem.); Piper v. Middaugh, 136 S. Ct. 2408 (2016) (mem.); Pickens v. Aldaba, 136 S. Ct. 479
(2015) (mem.).
172
536 U.S. 730 (2002).
173
Id. at 734–35.
174
Id. at 735.
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cooler in front of him.175 The lower courts granted qualified immunity to the
guards, finding that the law was not clearly established because the cases
Hope cited were not “materially similar to Hope’s situation.”176
The Supreme Court reversed, denying the guards qualified immunity
and noting that “the Eighth Amendment violation [wa]s obvious.”177 But
Hope explained that despite the guards’ conduct being in obvious violation
of the Constitution, they “may nevertheless be shielded from liability . . . if
their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”178
Hope recentered qualified immunity on the concept of “fair warning,”179
explaining that two earlier cases—where circuit courts explained that
“handcuffing inmates to the fence . . . for long periods of time”180 and
withholding water from inmates as a punishment181 violated the Eighth

175

Id.
Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit noted that the
clearly established test requires exacting specificity: “[w]hile we recognize that the
inappropriateness of the hitching post could be inferred from the[] opinions [cited by Hope],
a bright-line rule for qualified immunity purposes ‘is not to be found in abstractions . . . but in
studying how these abstractions have been applied in concrete circumstances.’” Hope v.
Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Lassiter v. Ala. A&M Univ. Bd. of Trs., 28
F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1994)).
177
Hope, 536 U.S. at 738.
178
Id. at 739 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Thus, despite
being considered to have created an “obviousness” exception to qualified immunity, see
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004), Hope actually explains that qualified immunity
can shield government officials even for obvious violations. It often does. See, e.g., Frasier v.
Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1015 (10th Cir. 2021) (granting qualified immunity to police who
seized video taken of them by a bystander to an arrest, despite having been trained that the
seizure violated the First Amendment); Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937, 939–40, 943
(9th Cir. 2019) (granting qualified immunity to police who stole more than $225,000 while
executing a search warrant).
179
Touching on another point of confusion surrounding qualified immunity, the “fair
warning” requirement derives from Section 1983’s criminal analogue, Section 242. 18 U.S.C.
§ 242. While Section 1983 permits a civil action against a person who violates the Constitution
under color of law, Section 242 permits their criminal prosecution, so long as they acted
“willfully.” The Supreme Court has largely ignored this additional mens rea requirement in
Section 242. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 662 & n.38 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring). Moreover, although qualified immunity does not apply to criminal
charges under Section 242 and depends on different considerations than the fair warning
requirement of Section 242 (qualified immunity’s concerns rest on policy, while Section 242
considerations flow from due process), the Court has treated the standards identically. See,
e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264–72 (1997).
180
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974).
181
See Ort v. White, 813 F.3d 318, 325–326 (11th Cir. 1987); Hope, 536 U.S. at 743
(explaining that “Ort’s premise is that ‘physical abuse directed at [a] prisoner after he
176
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Amendment—ensured that the guards “were fully aware of the wrongful
character of their conduct,” especially in light of Alabama prison regulations
and a report from the U.S. Department of Justice on the use of hitching
posts.182 In addition, “[t]he obvious cruelty inherent in this practice should
have provided . . . [the guards] with some notice that their alleged conduct
violated Hope’s constitutional protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.”183
Although aptly named, Hope failed to amount to much. That case and
Groh—where the Court denied qualified immunity to an officer who relied
on a facially invalid warrant184—stood out as aberrations in the Court’s
qualified immunity jurisprudence. Until the 2020 term.
A. THE RECENT DECISIONS IN TAYLOR V. RIOJAS AND MCCOY V.
ALAMU SUGGEST THAT THE COURT MAY BE ADJUSTING THE
APPLICATION OF THE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED TEST

Just months after denying the clutch of qualified immunity cases in June
2020, the Court handed down Taylor v. Riojas.185 In Taylor, the Court
confronted grotesque horror in an American prison.186 Trent Taylor, a Texas
inmate, spent six days in a pair of inhumane prison cells.187 In one, “almost
the entire surface—including the floor, ceiling, window, walls, and water
faucet—was covered with ‘massive amounts’ of feces that emitted a ‘strong
fecal odor.’”188 In that setting, Taylor was naked. He could not eat or drink
for fear of contamination because feces was even “packed inside the water
faucet.”189 Prison officials were aware of the conditions. Rather than clean
Taylor’s prison cell, officials laughed at Taylor and told him he was “going
to have a long weekend.”190 Taylor was then moved to another cell that had
no “toilet, water fountain, or bunk.”191 That cell was extremely cold and
referred to by other prisoners as “the cold room.”192 A guard told Taylor that
he hoped Taylor would “fucking freeze” in the cell, which had a drain in the
terminate[s] his resistance to authority would constitute an actionable eight amendment
violation.’”) (quoting Ort, 813 F.3d at 324).
182
Hope, 536 U.S. at 744–45.
183
Id. at 745.
184
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563–65 (2004).
185
141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (per curiam).
186
See id. at 53.
187
Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 218 (2019) [hereinafter Stevens].
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 218 n.9.
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floor where guards ordered Taylor to urinate.193 The drain was clogged and
smelled strongly of ammonia.194 Sewage from the drain also backed up onto
the floor, where Taylor had to sleep naked.195
Taylor sued the prison officials for violating his Eighth Amendment
rights.196 The Fifth Circuit agreed that the guards subjected Taylor to cruel
and unusual punishment, but held that the guards were entitled to qualified
immunity because it was not clearly established that “prisoners couldn’t be
housed in cells teeming with human waste” “for only six days.”197 In an
earlier case, the Fifth Circuit noted that it had merely held that prisoners
could not be held in those conditions “for months on end.”198 It “hadn’t
previously held that a time period so short violated the Constitution.”199
According to the Fifth Circuit, “[t]hat doom[ed] Taylor’s claim.”200
Surprisingly, it did not.
Addressing the case of “shockingly unsanitary cells,”201 the Supreme
Court breathed new life into Hope.202 Citing that case, the Court held that “no
reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that, under the extreme
circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house
Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period
of time.”203 Going further than Hope, Taylor did not even identify any earlier
decisions or directives that would have provided the officers specific notice
of a constitutional violation.204 Instead, Taylor said it was obvious:
“[c]onfronted with the particularly egregious facts of this case, any
reasonable officer should have realized that Taylor’s conditions of
confinement offended the Constitution.”205
Taylor could have been written off as another rare instance, like Hope,
where the Court was so offended by an especially egregious constitutional
violation that it was willing to make an exception to the clearly established
193

Id. at 218 & n.9.
Id. at 218.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 219.
197
Id. at 222.
198
Id. (citing McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1991)).
199
Id. (citing Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005–06 (5th Cir. 1998)).
200
Id. at 222.
201
Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020).
202
The Fifth Circuit had cited Hope but held that the prison officials did not have a “‘fair
warning’ that their specific actions were unconstitutional.” Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211,
222 (2019) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
203
Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 53.
204
See id. at 54.
205
Id.
194
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test.206 But the Court doubled down on Taylor just three months later with its
decision in McCoy v. Alamu.207 In that case, a prison guard sprayed inmate
Prince McCoy “directly in the face with his [chemical] spray for no reason
at all,” while McCoy was locked in his cell.208 McCoy sued, and the Fifth
Circuit again applied qualified immunity.209 Using a similarly constrained
understanding of the clearly established test as its decision in Taylor,210 the
Fifth Circuit held that the constitutional violation was not clearly established,
despite circuit decisions clearly establishing that a prison guard could not
punch, tase, or strike an inmate with a baton for no reason.211 Dissenting,
Judge Costa protested, citing Hope: “Qualified immunity is about notice. If
a public official knows that using force is unlawful in a given circumstance,
there is no reason to protect him for applying excessive and unreasonable
force merely because his means of applying it are novel.”212
The Supreme Court agreed. Employing its rarely used power of
summary reversal, much more commonly reserved for cases in which a
circuit court denied qualified immunity,213 the Court granted, vacated, and
remanded McCoy “for further consideration in light of Taylor.”214
Importantly, unlike Taylor, McCoy cannot be cabined off as just another
grotesquely outrageous case.215 While the actions of the prison guard in the
case were undoubtedly despicable, the defining feature of the case was that
the Fifth Circuit chose to make weapon-by-weapon comparisons while
considering whether precedent was clearly established.216 Thus, the case

206

See Jay Schweikert, The Supreme Court Won’t Save Us from Qualified Immunity,
CATO AT LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2021, 4:58 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-court-wontsave-us-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/EF4U-EL2S] (arguing that in Taylor, “the
Supreme Court at least made some effort to curb the worst excesses of the doctrine”).
207
See 141 S. Ct. 1364, 1364 (2021) (mem.).
208
McCoy v. Alamu, 950 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2020) [hereinafter Alamu].
209
Id. at 232.
210
See id. at 233 n.8 (“Some might find this a puzzling result, insofar as QI might have us
find a violation in one breath, but, in the next, hold it too debatable to prevent immunity. No
matter. What the first prong gives, the second prong will often snatch back.”).
211
Id. at 234–35 (Costa, J., dissenting) (citing Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 449, 454–
55 (5th Cir. 2016); Outlaw v. City of Hartford, 884 F.3d 351, 366–67 (2d Cir. 2018); Newman
v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 763–64 (5th Cir. 2012)).
212
Alamu, 950 F.3d. at 235 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); Newman, 703 F.3d at 764).
213
See supra note 159.
214
McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364, 1364 (2021) (mem.).
215
But see Schweikert, supra note 206 (arguing that just like Taylor, McCoy is about “the
worst excesses of qualified immunity”).
216
Alamu, 950 F.3d at 234–35 (Costa, J., dissenting).
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stands out not because the facts are “particularly egregious,”217 but because
the Fifth Circuit chose to slice the clearly established law very thinly, in a
continuation of the post-Harlow circuit court trend. Viewed in this light,
McCoy becomes a much more significant reversal and a signal from the Court
that the lower courts have taken the clearly established test too far.218
B. TANZIN V. TANVIR CASTS DOUBT ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Between Taylor and McCoy, the Supreme Court sent another signal that
it may be recalibrating qualified immunity. This time the Court addressed the
analytical foundation of the doctrine, instead of its application. It dealt with
the backbone of the modern-day doctrine of qualified immunity—policy. In
Tanzin v. Tanvir,219 the Court addressed whether damages against individual
federal officers were “appropriate relief” under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).220 Although the appeal explicitly did not address
the issue of qualified immunity,221 Tanzin’s unanimous exposition of the
historical role of damages against government officials and the Court’s
institutional inadequacy as a policymaking body directly undermine the
foundations of qualified immunity and cast doubt on Harlow.

217

Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020).
At first glance, the Supreme Court sent a different signal during its 2021 term when it
summarily reversed denials of qualified immunity in Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S.
___ (2021) (per curiam), and City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. ___ (2021) (per curiam).
Both cases involved excessive-force claims against police who, responding to 9-1-1 calls,
faced split-second decisions about how to react to armed individuals. Id. Although the pair of
decisions understandably engendered pessimism about the likelihood of qualified-immunity
reform at the Supreme Court, see Marcia Coyle, Reading the Tea Leaves on Qualified
Immunity, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 20, 2021, 10:53 AM), https://www.law.com/supremecourtbrief/
2021/10/20/qualified-immunity-scotus-amici-support-u-s-abortion-challenge-the-judge-term
-limits/ [https://perma.cc/M87G-USK2], Rivas-Villegas and Tahlequah represent an
unexceptional continuation of the Supreme Court’s general deference toward government
defendants in its application of the clearly established test, especially in cases involving
excessive force claims against law enforcement officers. See infra Appendix. Of the 27 cases
in which the Court granted immunity, 26 involved law enforcement officers, and, of those, all
involved Fourth Amendment claims, ten for excessive force. Taylor and McCoy, on the other
hand, stand out as rare instances in which the Court has sided with plaintiffs under the clearly
established test and are unique for their application of an obviousness exception to qualified
immunity. See supra Section III.A. That exception has already taken root in the circuit courts.
See Villarreal v. City of Laredo, ___ F.4th ___, *3–4 (5th Cir. 2021) (applying the obviousness
exception to reverse a grant of qualified immunity to police for a First Amendment violation).
219
141 S. Ct. 486 (2020).
220
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1).
221
Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 492, n*.
218
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Tanzin involved claims by several Muslim-American citizens and green
card holders, placed on the “No Fly List” by FBI agents in retaliation for their
refusal to act as informants in their religious communities.222 Because of the
FBI agents’ actions, the men were prohibited from flying for several years,
lost substantial sums of money, were unable to visit family in other countries,
wasted airline tickets, and lost jobs.223 The plaintiffs sued various FBI agents
in their official and personal capacities, seeking removal from the No Fly List
and money damages. More than a year after the plaintiffs sued, the
government informed them that they could fly again, thus mooting their
injunctive claims, but they continued with their damages claims against the
individual FBI agents under RFRA.224
RFRA secures the right to free exercise under the First Amendment.225
Congress passed RFRA in the wake of the Court’s decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, which held that the First Amendment permitted laws that
burden religious exercise, so long as those laws were neutral and generally
applicable.226 RFRA sought to restore the pre-Smith standard, “provid[ing] a
claim . . . to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government”227 and enabled a person so burdened to “obtain appropriate
relief against a government.”228 RFRA further defined “government” to
include “a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other
person acting under color of law) of the United States.”229
The district court dismissed the individual capacity claims against the
FBI agents, ruling that RFRA does not permit monetary relief.230 The Second

222

Id. at 489.
Tanvir v. Tanzin, 894 F.3d 449, 453 (2d Cir. 2018). The Second Circuit’s opinion
describes behavior by the FBI that sounds an awful lot like a protection racket. In one instance,
Tanvir, a long-haul trucker, was in Atlanta for work when he heard his mother was visiting
New York from Pakistan. Tanvir booked a flight back, but an airport employee informed him
that he could not fly. At that time, FBI agents approached him and directed him to call another
agent who had previously pressured him to become an informant. He was forced to travel back
to New York by bus, where an agent told Tanvir that if he answered her questions, “she would
help remove his name from the ‘No Fly List.’” Because he declined, Tanvir had to quit his
job. Id. at 456.
224
Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 489.
225
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
226
See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885–90 (1990).
227
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)–(2).
228
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).
229
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1).
230
Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020).
223
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Circuit reversed, finding that “government” includes individual officials 231
and “appropriate relief” includes money damages.232
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, analogizing RFRA claims
to constitutional claims, highlighting the long history of damages claims
against government officials in the United States, and explicitly rejecting the
government’s request that the Court shield government officials from
litigation for the very same policy reasons set out in Harlow.233 Writing for
the Court, Justice Thomas explained that the “legal ‘backdrop against which
Congress enacted’ RFRA confirms the propriety of individual capacity
suits.”234 “The phrase ‘persons acting under color of law’ draws on one of the
most well-known civil rights statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute applies
to ‘person[s] . . . under color of any statute,’ and this Court has long
interpreted it to permit suits against officials in their official capacities.” 235
Turning to the meaning of “appropriate relief,” the Court again drew parallels
to constitutional claims, holding that “RFRA made clear that it was
reinstating both the pre-Smith substantive protections of the First
Amendment and the right to vindicate those protections by a claim.”236
The Court also explored the historical role damages played against
individual government officials. “In the context of suits against Government
officials, the Court said, “damages have long been awarded as appropriate
relief.”237 Tanzin further explained that common-law causes of action against
government officials “remained available throughout the 19th century and
into the 20th.”238 Noting that damages are still available today against

231

Tanvir v. Tanzin, 894 F.3d 449, 462 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[G]iven both RFRA’s and Section
1983’s applicability to ‘person[s]’ acting ‘under color of law,’ we hold that RFRA, like
Section 1983, authorizes a plaintiff to bring individual capacity claims against federal officials
or other ‘person[s] acting under color of [federal] law.’”).
232
Id. at 463 (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 65–66 (1992))
(“[W]hen faced with the question of what remedies are available under a statute that provides
a private right of action, [the Court] presume[s] the availability of all appropriate remedies
unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
233
Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 490–93.
234
Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 490 (citing Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 487
(2005)).
235
Id. (citing Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305–06 & n.8 (1986)).
236
Id. at 492.
237
Id. at 491 (citing Pfander & Hunt, supra note 28, at 1871–75, 1875 n.52).
238
Id. (citing Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Elliot v. Swartwout, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1852); Buck v.
Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866); Belknap v. Schlid, 161 U.S. 10 (1896); Philadelphia
Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912)).
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federal,239 state, and local officials, the Court drew on its experience with
Section 1983, explaining that the “availability of damages” under that statute
was “particularly salient” to its analysis.240
Finally, the Court rejected the government’s reliance on policy to create
a new immunity. The government argued that the policy decisions underlying
the Court’s creation of qualified immunity demanded the Court’s creation of
a similar exemption for damages under RFRA, even citing Harlow and other
qualified immunity cases for the proposition that damages claims would
prevent government officials from properly discharging their duties.241
Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Thomas responded not only by
explaining that the damages remedy “has coexisted with our constitutional
system since the dawn of the Republic,” but also by emphasizing that
although there “may be policy reasons why Congress may wish to shield
Government employees from personal liability, and Congress is free to do
so . . . there are no constitutional reasons why we must do so in its stead.” 242

239
Besides providing a promising nod toward reforming qualified immunity, Tanzin also
provides the Court’s most direct acknowledgement that the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679,
provides the statutory basis for some category of Bivens claims. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 491 (“In
1988 the Westfall Act foreclosed common-law claims for damages against federal officials,
but it left open claims for constitutional violations . . . .”); see also Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S.
Ct. 735, 748 n.9 (2020) (“The [Westfall] Act . . . permits claims ‘brought for a violation of the
Constitution.’ By enacting this provision, Congress made clear that it was not attempting to
abrogate Bivens . . . . [T]he provision . . . left Bivens where it found it [in 1988].”) (citations
omitted and responding to Brief for the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners 21, Hernandez v. Mesa, 149 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678); Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017). That codification is crucial because the antipathy from the Court
toward an implied cause of action against federal officials under the Constitution has been
founded on a concern that Congress has not provided an explicit constitutional cause of action
against federal officials. See, e.g., Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857; Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 752
(Thomas, J., concurring). The Court did not note that concern in Harlow, which involved
claims against federal officials. Rather, it presumed the availability of Bivens claims against
the federal defendants and created qualified immunity to address perceived policy concerns
with individual liability. See supra Section II.B.1. Indeed, one third of the Court’s qualified
immunity cases have involved claims against federal officials. See Appendix. So, it is curious
that as the availability of Bivens claims has weakened, see, e.g., Ziglar and Hernandez, supra,
the availability of qualified immunity has only grown stronger, see supra Section II.B.2.
240
Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 492.
241
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 13–14, Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) (No.
19-71) (citing Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858, 1860–61; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814
(1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)); see also Brief for Petitioners at
29–30, Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) (No. 19-71) (citations omitted) (arguing that
“[d]amages remedies against federal employees in their personal capacities could . . . impose
‘costs and consequences to the government itself,’ potentially including costs of ‘defense and
indemnification.’”).
242
Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 493.

2022]

RECALIBRATING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

139

The cases cited by Justice Thomas not only establish the historical
availability of damages, but the historical unavailability of court-created
immunities.243 Illustrating the overlap between Tanzin’s analysis and
qualified immunity, Justice Thomas cited the same cases, or authorities
relying on those cases, in his dissent in Baxter, calling for the Court to
reconsider qualified immunity.244
Driving that point home, Justice Thomas ended Tanzin with a statement
that sounds much more like Justice Story’s in The Apollon than Justice
Powell’s in Harlow: “To the extent the Government asks us to create a new
policy-based presumption against damages against individual officials, we
are not at liberty to do so. Congress is best suited to create such a policy. Our
task is simply to interpret the law as an ordinary person would.”245
Although presented outside the four walls of qualified immunity, Tanzin
makes clear that policy cannot permit the Court to create special protections
for government officials—no matter how good the policy reasons.246 Further,
243

See Little, 6 U.S. at 179 (refusing to excuse legal violations committed by a navy
captain at the order of the president); Swartwout, 35 U.S. at 158 (“[T]he collector is personally
liable to an action to recover back an excess of duties paid to him as collector, under the
circumstances stated in the point; although he may have paid over the money into the
treasury.”); Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 137 (“Consequently the order given was an order to do an
illegal act; to commit a trespass upon the property of another; and can afford no justification
to the person by whom it was executed.”); Buck, 70 U.S. at 344 (noting that a marshal’s error
in judgment subjects him to liability and “the court can afford him no protection against the
parties so injured”); Belknap, 161 U.S. at 18 (reasoning federal officers can be “personally
liable to an action of tort by a private person whose rights of property they have wrongfully
invaded or injured, even by authority of the United States”); Philadelphia Co., 223 U.S. at
619–20 (“The exemption of the United States from suit does not protect its officers from
personal liability to persons whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded.”).
244
Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1864 (2020) (citing, for example, Baude, supra note
106, at 57; Engdahl, supra note 34, at 14–21, 48–55; Little, 6 U.S. at 179; Woolhandler, supra
note 55, at 414–22).
245
Id.
246
The Court’s aversion to policy makes particularly good sense when applied to qualified
immunity because empirical research has disproven all of the policy assumptions relied on by
the Court in justifying the creation of qualified immunity. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz,
Qualified Immunity’s Boldest Lie, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 605 (2021); Joanna C. Schwartz, The
Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018); Joanna C. Schwartz,
How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017). In fact, scholars warned the Court of
this knowledge gap before Harlow. The Court was aware of those warnings. Compare Peter
H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for
Damages, 1980 S. CT. REV. 281, 282 (1980) (“Some of these problems [created by allowing
suits against government officials] cannot readily be resolved. The answers turn in part upon
empirical data that are unavailable.”) with Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 nn.22 & 35 (citing Schuck,
supra, at 324–27). Moreover, in his paper twice-cited by Harlow, Professor Schuck warned
that wide-ranging changes to governmental immunity standards should come from Congress,
not the Supreme Court. Schuck, supra, at 346. The Court did not heed that warning.
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Tanzin is explicitly connected by analogy to constitutional claims and the
historical backdrop of Section 1983. As noted above, Harlow “completely
reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law.”247 If consistently applied, the principles set forth in Tanzin
should cause another reformulation of qualified immunity, if not its
wholesale abandonment.
Combined with the Court’s decisions in Taylor and McCoy, Tanzin
signals that the Court’s 2020 term could be the beginning of the end for
qualified immunity. Although there is no way to tell when the Court might
take more concrete steps toward recalibrating qualified immunity—and it is
doubtful that the Court will simply overrule Harlow anytime soon—its recent
decisions cast doubt on both the application and theory underlying the clearly
established test.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court created qualified immunity through an act of
judicial policymaking. Its creation bucked centuries of American
constitutional norms and judicial history. Although the past four decades
since Harlow have seen the Court make it increasingly difficult for civil
rights plaintiffs to overcome the burden of qualified immunity, the Court’s
decisions this term in Taylor, McCoy, and Tanzin herald a change in the
Court’s approach. Whether that means that the Court will simply nudge
qualified immunity in the opposite direction or revisit the doctrine wholesale
remains to be seen. Either way, the stage is set for the Court to apply the
historical analysis of Tanzin to qualified immunity and confront the reality
that qualified immunity has no basis in any American law, congressionally
enacted statute, or the Constitution.

247

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
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APPENDIX
Supreme Court Applications of the Qualified Immunity Standard from 1982
through 2021248
Case
Rivas-Villegas v.
Cortesluna,† 595
U.S. ___ (2021)
City of Tahlequah
v. Bond,† 595 U.S.
(2021)
Taylor v. Riojas,†
141 S. Ct. 52
(2020)
City of Escondido
v. Emmons,* † 139
S. Ct. 500 (2019)
Kisela v. Hughes,†
138 S. Ct. 1148
(2018)
District of
Columbia v.
Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577 (2018)
Hernandez v.
Mesa,* 137 S. Ct.
2003 (2017)
Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843
(2017)
White v. Pauly, *†
137 S. Ct. 548
(2017)
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Official

Claim

Merits
Reached
No

Lower
Court
9th
Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No

10th
Cir.

State Prison
Officials

8th Amendment

Yes

5th
Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No

9th
Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No

9th Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Arrest)

Yes

D.C.
Cir.

Federal Law
Enforcement
(Border Patrol)
DOJ & Federal
Prison
Officials
State Law
Enforcement

5th Amendment
(Due Process)

No

5th Cir.

5th Amendment
(Equal Protection)

No

2d Cir.

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No

10th
Cir.

This appendix builds on the appendix assembled by Professor Baude in his 2018
Article Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, supra note 106, at 88. Cases where the Court found
no immunity are indicated in bold, cases remanded for further determination of immunity by
an asterisk, and summary reversals by a dagger. Thank you to our colleague Daniel Rankin
for his help on the appendix.
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Merits
Reached
No

Lower
Court
5th Cir.

Mullenix v. Luna,†
577 U.S. 7 (2015)

State Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

Taylor v. Barkes,†
575 U.S. 822
(2015)
San Francisco v.
Sheehan, 575 U.S.
600 (2015)
Carroll v.
Carman,† 574
U.S. 13 (2014)
Lane v. Franks,
573 U.S. 228
(2014)
Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 572 U.S.
765 (2014)
Wood v. Moss,
572 U.S. 744
(2014)

State Prison
Officials

8th Amendment

No

3d Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No.

9th Cir.

State Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Search)

No

3d Cir.

College
President

1st Amendment
(Employment)

Yes

11th
Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

Yes

6th Cir.

Federal Law
Enforcement
(Secret
Service)
Local Law
Enforcement

1st Amendment
(Assembly)

No

9th Cir.

4th Amendment
(Illegal Entry)

No

9th Cir.

Federal Law
Enforcement
(Secret
Service)
City Outside
Counsel

1st Amendment
(Retaliation)

No

10th
Cir.

4th Amendment
(Search)

No

9th
Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)

No

9th
Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Search)

Yes

9th
Cir.

Stanton v. Sims,†
571 U.S. 3 (2013)
Reichle v.
Howards, 566
U.S. 658 (2012)
Filarsky v. Delia,
566 U.S. 377
(2012)
Messerschmidt v.
Millender, 565
U.S. 535 (2012)
Ryburn v. Huff,†
565 U.S. 469
(2012)
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Merits
Reached
Yes

Lower
Court
9th
Cir.

4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)

Yes

9th
Cir.

State Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Illegal Entry)

No

10th
Cir.

Local Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No

9th
Cir.

Federal Law
Enforcement
(ATF)
State Prison
Officials

4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)

Yes

9th
Cir.

8th Amendment

Yes

11th
Cir.

Federal Law
Enforcement
(Military
Police)
Federal Law
Enforcement
(Fish and
Wildlife)
State &
Federal Law
Enforcement
(U.S.
Marshals)
Federal Law
Enforcement
(Secret
Service)

4th Amendment
(Excessive Force)

No

9th
Cir.

4th Amendment
(Search)

Yes

9th
Cir.

4th Amendment
(Search)

Yes

4th
Cir.

4th Amendment
(Arrest)

No

9th
Cir.

Case

Official

Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S.
731 (2011)
Safford Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Redding, 557 U.S.
364 (2009)
Pearson v.
Callahan, 555
U.S. 223 (2009)
Brosseau v.
Haugen,† 543
U.S. 194 (2004)
Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551
(2004)

U.S. Attorney
General

4th Amendment
(Arrest)

School
Officials

Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730
(2002)
Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194
(2001)
Hanlon v. Berger,
526 U.S. 808
(1999)
Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603
(1999)

Hunter v. Bryant,†
502 U.S. 224
(1991)
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Anderson v.
Creighton,* 483
U.S. 635 (1987)
Malley v. Briggs,*
475 U.S. 335
(1986)
Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511 (1985)
Davis v. Scherer,
468 U.S. 183
(1984)
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,* 457
U.S. 800 (1982)

Official

Claim
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Merits
Reached
No

Lower
Court
8th
Cir.

Federal Law
Enforcement
(FBI)
State Law
Enforcement

4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)
4th Amendment
(Arrest)

No

1st
Cir.

U.S. Attorney
General

4th Amendment
(Search/Seizure)

Yes

3d
Cir.

State Law
Enforcement

14th Amendment
(Due Process)

No

11th
Cir.

Presidential
Aides

1st Amendment
(Employment)

No

D.C.
Cir.

* Supreme Court found no immunity.
** Case remanded for further determination of immunity.

